卡尔梅•桑丹：论西藏的宗教与政治

图为布达拉宫内，关于五世达赖喇嘛的壁画。

论西藏的宗教与政治

文：Samten G. Karmay（卡尔梅•桑丹）
译者：沉默的安多哇

原载：故乡网（2008年9月13日）
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=22803&article=Tibetan+Religion+and+Politics

西 藏人相信“教政结合”（藏语为“却色松在”）是他们的一个独特传统，并以此感到骄傲。这一概念本身在西藏历史中源远流长。不过，很多其他国家依然保有类似 的传统。只是在20世纪初，像法国和日本这样的国家才开始立法，实行教会与国家的分离，并由此产生了宗教习俗作为一种个人信仰不属国家管辖的概念。国家世 俗化的进程是缓慢的，但也是不可逆转的。国家世俗化是一股波及世界很多国家的现代潮流。

在2008年5月3日至4日，人们惊奇地看到在达 兰萨拉举行了一次政治会议，并在YOUTUBE网站上进行了转播。来自西藏各教派的领袖参加了这次会议，会议由尊者达赖喇嘛主持。会议的议题之一是朱古 （转世喇嘛）问题，不过讨论结果尚未公布。没有任何世俗人士，更没有妇女参加这次会议。人们想知道以民主化著称的印度流亡藏人社区发生了什么。

教 会与国家的分离并非意味着放弃原有的宗教习俗。相反，它保障了宗教活动的自由，从而也保障了个人愿意信仰或是不信仰一种宗教的个人选择权。它使得政府尤其 在涉及教派问题时获得了一种中立地位。就西藏而言，无论是本教、宁玛派、萨迦派、噶举派或是格鲁派，甚至西藏的伊斯兰教和基督教，都将享有平等地位。不 过，这种“分离”确实意味着政府与宗教组织的相互独立而非像西藏政治传统中的相互结合。

一个世俗政府是中立的，因而在处理宗教问题时不支持也不反对某一个特定的教派，也不给属于某个特定教派的公民以特殊优惠待遇。

作为国教的佛教

佛 教在赞普赤松德赞（742-797）在位时期成为西藏的国教，直到公元941年图博王朝结束。图博王朝时期的赞普是国家首脑并且都是世俗人士。佛教成为国 教的事实并没有影响到王室成员和国内民众的个人信仰选择。不过，王朝政府确实资助了诸如寺院修建等佛教事业，这被认为是积累功德的行为。

西藏历史上还有一些世俗政府当政时期，比如，藏巴汗政权（1600-1642）曾因试图恢复图博王朝时期世俗政府的荣耀而引人注目。

神权统治的开端

然 而，格鲁派势力在1642年鼓动藏蒙联军推翻了藏巴汗政府，并拥奉五世达赖喇嘛（1617-1685）成为国家首脑。在1642年以前，五世达赖喇嘛只是 哲蚌寺的法台。对僧侣的无上权威和世俗势力的辅佐开启了一个神权统治的新纪元。在13到15世纪的萨迦和帕竹政权期间，虽曾存在过一些神权统治发展的要 素，但是1642年政府正式定址于甘丹寺，甘丹颇章象征着一个神权政府最终在理论和实际上都获得了最高权力。这确实是佛教在西藏历史上获得的前所未有的胜 利。

“神权统治”一词，通常定义为一种将一个“神”或“神祇”奉为国家最高统治者的政府形势。以西藏来说，达赖喇嘛被认为是观世音菩萨的 化身。在这样一个神权体系中，国家首脑不仅是民众的政治领袖，而且是他们的精神上师。换句话说，所有民众除了臣服之外还形成了一种精神上的师徒关系。在这 种以宗教为根本纽带的情形下，所有皈依者哪怕做梦也不会反对他们上师的观点。因为这样就等于破坏了师徒之间的神圣关系。那么把达赖喇嘛奉为政治领袖同时又 是时轮灌顶授予者的流亡藏人，该如何探讨民主呢?

由于国家首脑是“僧侣国王”，培养儿童的所有方法从幼小起便都沉浸在宗教教育当中，没有 人意识到这种方法可能引致的结果。在这样的体系中，不存在愿意信仰何种宗教的个人选择。一个人只有成年之后才知道该服从于谁。换言之，信仰完全是由政府施 加的。而个人信仰的选择权利则是闻所未闻，或者用现代术语来说是被“排拒”了。在过去的360年中，这种宗教教育或许是重要的，甚至有启蒙作用，但是却产 生了阻碍全体民众接触任何进步或现代教育的负面作用。直言不讳的法国文化部部长、社会主义者克劳德•阿里格里先生，曾经说过他从来没有遇见一个西藏人是生 物学家、考古学家、数学家或物理学家，他的言论并不令人吃惊。

转世喇嘛治国

不过，西 藏的国家首脑原先并非由转世喇嘛充任。这种状况是偶然地由于五世达赖喇嘛被拥奉为国家领袖而传承下来。具有讽刺意味的是，不仅他自己是一位转世喇嘛，他还 着手开创其他的转世世系，比如，班禅喇嘛洛桑益西（1663-1737）于1667年被五世达赖喇嘛认定为班禅喇嘛洛桑曲坚的转世。这使得尤其在格鲁派中 朱古的数量迅速增加，人们或许没有必要质问朱古制度是否曾有益于西藏的国家利益。不过，朱古制度给西藏带来众多的政治动荡和分崩离析，现在是西藏人该从其 坎坷历史中吸取教训的时候了。

仅仅在20世纪，诸如满清、英属印度、沙皇俄国、国民党政府以及现在的共产党中国等列强，他们设计利用一个 喇嘛反对另一个喇嘛，屡屡造成国家统一的土崩瓦解。总体来讲，综观整个西藏历史，朱古制度一直是社会分裂、政治阴谋和教派纷争的肇因。由于朱古传统，我们 现在有两个班禅喇嘛和两个噶玛巴。我们还要有两个达赖喇嘛吗？

最近，中国政府的国务院宗教事务局颁行了一个称为“第五号令”的新法规，包含14个条款。该法规是关于“藏传佛教活佛转世管理办法”。中国政府对朱古认定的严格管制，进一步证明了朱古制度在政治上是何等脆弱，是何等的容易被占领者利用于违背西藏人民利益的政治目的。

十 四世尊者达赖喇嘛业已宣布如果“真正的自治”在西藏得以实现，他将不再担当任何政治角色。不过，我相信，如果大多数西藏人同意，达赖喇嘛体制将会得以保 持。那么，在未来的宪法中，达赖喇嘛体制应该成为国内唯一的转世活佛系统，并且不拥有任何政治特权。甘丹寺应该是未来达赖喇嘛们理想的驻锡地，如果他们愿 意成为真正的一介比丘。

在一次接受《欧洲新闻》的采访中，十四世尊者达赖喇嘛曾说：“达赖喇嘛的作用已经过时了。”如果这是实情，而我也 相信这是实情。那么，现在是西藏人民在达赖喇嘛的帮助下开始筹划自己未来的理想时机。他是拥有长期国际经验的唯一人选，他的权威性在西藏领袖中也无人可 比。现在是当机立断的紧要关头。如果他愿意，他可以帮助西藏人民走出神权统治的谜局，并留下一份教政彻底分离的明确无误的政治遗产。

除非或直到西藏人民最终理解了教政分离的必要，他们将永远无法在一个真正民选领袖的领导下创建一个健康而团结的社会。

他 们无须舍近求远找寻好榜样。2008年，喜马拉雅王国不丹成功引入了议会民主制。虽然以仲达仓为代表的噶举派是不丹官方宗教，但是宗教被置于一边而没有在 大选中发挥任何作用。不丹新宪法宣布“宗教组织和人士的职责，在于发扬光大国家的精神遗产并确保宗教与不丹的政治相分离……”（不丹新宪法第3条第3款， 见www.judiciary.gov.bt）

诚然，要打破西藏人教政分离问题上的禁忌似乎是不可思议甚或是渎神的，但是我们再也不能采取鸵鸟政策了。

世俗主义，宗派主义

2008 年4月，在东京接受的一次采访中，尊者达赖喇嘛称他实际上赞成“世俗主义”。他给出的理由是“世俗主义”将不会给“宗派主义”留下任何空间。确实藏传佛教 时常受祸于教派纷争，这种纷争依然在延续，尽管尊者达赖喇嘛不遗余力地对之进行劝阻和谴责。正是为了避免教派纷争，达赖喇嘛不仅自己放弃了对修丹护法神的 崇拜，并且在流亡社区的所有宗教组织里加以禁止。放弃这一崇拜的主要原因，在于它使得格鲁派僧众产生一种优越感并且诅咒其他教派，正如人们在解释为何这一 崇拜遭到禁止时所声称的——这不仅仅是一个神灵崇拜问题。

流亡社区的世俗化将会让宗教干预远离政治，从而有助于解决纠缠不清的教派问题，并引领西藏人民获得真正的团结。

Tibetan Religion and Politics

Phayul[Saturday, September 13, 2008 12:16]
Samten G. Karmay

The Tibetans prided themselves on what they believed to be a unique tradition, the "combination of religion and politics" (chosi zungdrel). The concept itself goes a long way back in Tibet's history. However, many other countries still have similar traditions. It was only at the beginning of the 20th century that countries like France and Japan began to have the legislation for the separation of church and state that gave birth to the idea of practicing religion as a personal belief not regulated by the state. The process of secularization has been slow, but it is moving inexorably forward. This state secularism is the modern trend in many countries the world over.

It was startling to see a political meeting that took place in Dharamsala on May 3-4 2008 and broadcast on YouTube. It was attended by the heads of all the Tibetan religious sects and was presided over by HH the Dalai Lama. One of the topics of the discussion was the tulku issue, the reincarnated lamas, but the outcome of the discussion has not been reported. Not a single layman took part in the gathering not to mention any women. One wondered what happened to the famous democratization of the exiled Tibetan community in India.

The separation of church and state does not imply abandoning the practice of the established religion. Far from it, it secures freedom of religious exercise and therefore the right of personal choice whether one wishes to practice a religion or not. Furthermore it establishes the neutrality of the state as far as the religious denominations are concerned. In the case of Tibet there would be no preferential status whether it is the Bon, Nyingma, Sakya, Kagyu or Gelug traditions or even the Tibetan Moslems and Christians. What the "separation" does imply, however, is the government and religious institutions being kept independent from one and another and not combined as in the Tibetan political tradition.

A secular state is therefore neutral when it deals with religion by not supporting or opposing any particular sect nor does it give any preferential treatment for a citizen who belongs to a particular religion.

Buddhism as a state religion

Buddhism became the state religion of Tibet in the reign of the emperor Tri Song Detsen (742-797) and it remained so till the end of the Pugyal Dynasty in 941 AD. During the imperial period the emperors were the supreme heads of the state and the emperors were entirely laymen. The fact that Buddhism was the state religion did not affect the personal choice of faith among its members and in the country. However, the imperial government did subsidize Buddhist establishments such as building temples and contributing to their maintenance and this was considered to be meritorious work.

There were other periods during which time a lay government was in power in Tibet, for example, during the Tsang Desi's regime (c.1600-1642) which was most remarkable in its attempt to revive the national glory of the lay government of the imperial period.

The beginning of theocracy

However, in 1642 the Tsang Desi's government was toppled by the combined forces of Tibetans and Mongols at the instigation of the Gelug sect which effectively empowered the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1685), as the head of state. He had been, until 1642, merely the abbot of Drepung Monastery. A new era of theocracy was ushered in with the total supremacy of the clergy and the subordination of laymen to it. At the time of the Sakya and Pakmotu administrations from the 13th to the 15th centuries there were of course elements of theocratic development, but from 1642 the Ganden Potrang, the official seat of the government in Drepung Monastery, came to symbolize the supreme power in both the theory and practice of a theocratic government. This was indeed a political triumph that Buddhism had never known in its history in Tibet.

The term "theocracy" is normally defined as a form of government in which a 'god' or 'deity' is recognized as the supreme ruler. In Tibet's case the Dalai Lamas are considered as the manifestation of the Buddhist deity of compassion. In this theocratic system the head of the state was not only the political leader of the people, but also their spiritual master. In other words, the whole population was subjected and put in the position of spiritual disciple to the master. Within the context of this essentially religious bond no devotee would ever dream of opposing the view of the master, because that would be tantamount to breaking the sacred relationship between the master and the disciple. How does this fit with the discussion of democracy among the Tibetans in exile for whom HH the Dalai Lama is the political leader, but who nonetheless bestows on them the Kalachakra initiation?

Since the head of the state was a "monk-king" (domtsun gyalpo) the entire manner of raising children was immersed in religious education from a very young age without it ever being realized where this was going to lead. In such a system there was no personal choice of the religion that an individual wished to practice. One became aware of what one was subjected to only when one reached a mature age. In other words the faith was simply imposed by the state. The idea of the right of personal choice of one's own faith was therefore totally unknown and in modern terms denied. Important and even enlightening as this religious education might be, it had the undesirable effect of barring the entire population from contact with any kind of progressive or modern education over the last three hundred and sixty years. It is no wonder that the outspoken French socialist Minister of Culture, Claude Allègre, once remarked that he had never come across a Tibetan who was a biologist, archeologist, mathematician or physicist.

An incarnate Lama as ruler

The head of the state in Tibet, however, was never meant to be a tulku, a reincarnate lama. This status was inherited incidentally through the Fifth Dalai Lama when he was ushered in as the leader of the country. The irony is that not only he himself was a reincarnate lama, but he also embarked on creating others, for example, the Panchen Lama Lobzang Yeshe (1663-1737), who was recognized as the tulku of Panchen Lama Lobzang Chogyen (1567-1662), in 1667, by the Fifth Dalai Lama. This initiated the rapid increase of the number of tulkus especially in the Gelug sect. Perhaps one does not need to raise the question as to whether this tulku system ever served the national interest of Tibet at all. It is high time for the Tibetans to learn lessons from the checkered history of the tulku system that has caused so much political instability and disunity for Tibet.

In the 20th century alone, national unity completely broke down when one lama was set against the other as the pawns of great powers such as the Manchus, British India, the Russian Empire, the Guomintang government and now the Communist Party of China. In general, throughout the history of Tibet the tulku institution has invariably been the cause of schism, political intrigue and sectarian squabbles. Because of the tulku tradition we have now two Panchen Lamas and two Karmapas. Are we going to have two Dalai Lamas?

Recently the Religious Affairs Department of the Chinese government implemented a new law called "Order no. 5", containing 14 articles on "Management Measures for the Reincarnation of 'Living Buddhas' in Tibetan Buddhism". The Chinese government's strict control over tulku recognition further proves how politically vulnerable this system is and to what extent the tulku tradition can be exploited for political ends by an occupying power against the interests of the Tibetan people.

HH the 14th Dalai Lama has already announced that he will have no political role if "genuine autonomy" is established in Tibet. However, I believe that the Dalai Lama institution should be maintained if the majority of the Tibetan people agree upon it. Thus, in a future constitution this one should be the only incarnation in the country, and without any political prerogative. Ganden Monastery would be an ideal residence for the future Dalai Lamas if they wish to be a real "simple monk".

In the interview given to Euronews (August 11, 2008) HH the 14th Dalai Lama stated, I quote: "The Dalai Lama's rule is now outdated." If this is indeed the case, and I believe it to be so. it is desirable for the Tibetan people start to planning for the future with his help. He is the only one who has such long term world-wide experience and whose authority is unrivaled amongst Tibetan leaders. A decisive action is needed to be taken and very urgently. If he wishes he can assist the Tibetans in sorting out the theocratic conundrum in order to finally leave an unambiguous political legacy in the form of a total separation of religion and politics.

Unless and until the Tibetan people come to comprehend the need for the separation of religion and state they will never be able to create a healthy and unified community under a truly democratically elected leader.

They do not need to look far a field for a good example of this. In 2008 Bhutan, the Himalayan kingdom, very successfully introduced a parliamentary democratic system. Although the Kagyu sect is the official religion of state as represented by the Zhung Datsang, this was left aside and did not play any role in the election. Its new constitution states "It shall be the responsibility of religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country while also ensuring that religion remains separate from politics in Bhutan.."(article 3.3, www.judiciary.gov.bt)

Of course it appears inconceivable or even sacrilegious to break the taboo on the separation of religion and state for the Tibetans, but we can no longer hide our heads in the sand.

Secularism, sectarianism

In an interview given in Tokyo, April 2008, HH the Dalai Lama stated that he favoured in fact "secularism". The reason he gave was that "secularism" has no room for "sectarianism". Indeed Tibetan Buddhism has often been plagued by sectarian strife and this is still continuing in spite of HH the Dalai Lama's strenuous efforts to discourage and condemn it. It is precisely because of sectarianism that he has himself abandoned the cult of the deity Shugden, as well as forbidding it in all religious institutions in the exiled community. The main reason for forsaking this cult is that it engenders a sense of the superiority on the part of the Geluk clergy and it acts as an anathema to the other sects. It is not only a question of spirit-worship as people tend to claim when explaining why the cult has been forbidden.

A secularization of the exiled community should contribute towards solving the unending sectarian problems and lead to true unity amongst the Tibetan people, without any further religious interference in the political domain.

The writer is Director of Research emeritus, National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS), Paris